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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Young encumbered his brief with page after page of facts unrelated to
any issue before this Court but failed to provide any meaningful analysis of the issues
actually presented. For example, he provides six pages of facts which he claims are
supportive of the firm's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Yet the
jury was not asked to and did not find that any such breach occurred. That is simply
not an issue in this appeal.
Mr. Young's brief fails to identify any promise by the firm that he would be
fairly compensated or cite any authority supporting the proposition that if such a
promise had been made to a salaried employee that it would be enforceable. While he
purports to cite authority for what he claims to be the law that mere employees owe
their employers no fiduciary duty of noncompetition, he provides the Court with no
language from any Court which so holds or even implies that such is a correct
statement of the law.
In short, Mr. Young's sole argument is that because he won below he is
entitled to prevail on appeal. That argument is wholly unresponsive to the specific
claims of error presented in the firm's opening brief.
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POINT I.

MR. YOUNG PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS
PROMISED A FAIR PORTION OF THE FEE AT ISSUE IN THIS
CASE.
In his brief, Mr. Young repeatedly contends that the evidence presented at

trial "amply supports" the jury verdict. He fails entirely, however, to point to any
evidence demonstrating the existence of a promise made by the firm to Mr. Young
other than the firm's agreement to pay him a fixed salary to work for the firm as an
associate attorney. He offers no authority in support of his assertion that the parties'
words were sufficient to be the basis of any enforceable agreement but simply contends
that the firm's "legal arguments are all answered by the fact that the jury was properly
instructed. . ." Brief of Young at p. 38. Apparently, Mr. Young believes a properly
instructed jury is free to disregard those instructions and enter a verdict lacking an
evidentiary basis. Such a view of the law is obviously inaccurate. See, e.g., Fitz v.
Synthes, (USA), 990 P.2d 391 (Utah 1991) (reversing jury verdict for insufficient
evidence); Geisdorf v. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (reversing jury verdict for
insufficient evidence).
Mr. Young fails to identify any statement by any representative of the firm at
any time which constitutes a promise from the firm to Mr. Young that he would be paid
"fairly." In the absence of such a promise, no contract can be formed. Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). In the absence of
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such a promise, there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict and it must be
reversed.
It was obvious from Mr. Young's counsel's argument to the jury that he
knew what testimony was necessary to establish an agreement. It is also noteworthy
that what Mr. Young has not been able to present to this Court is the evidence he relied
upon in seeking to convince the jury that such an agreement had been reached between
Mr. Young and the firm. When not bound by the reality of a transcript of the
testimony, Mr. Young's counsel was able to portray the testimony as being far different
from that which was actually given. He represented, or rather misrepresented, to the
jury that Mr. Chindlund had expressly admitted that the firm agreed to pay Mr. Young
a fair portion of the fee in question. He drew the jury's attention to what he contended
was a specific question to, and response from, Mr. Chindlund.
But then Mr. Eckersley asked the question again, and
this time he asked it differently, and he asked "Mr.
Chindlund, did you ever agree with Mr. Young that the
firm would pay him fair and equitable compensation?"
And what did Mr. Chindlund say? "Yes." That was the
last word out of his mouth in his [direct] examination.
R. at 2027, p. 457.
In reality, the exchange was as follows:
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Q.

At any time, in the meetings that you had with Mr.
Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your presence,
promise Mr. Young that he would receive a fair and
equitable portion of the fee?

A.

We told Rob that the firm wanted to treat him
fairly.

Q.

Did you promise him that you would?

A.

Not in the sense of a promise. It was along the
lines of "The firm wants to treat you fairly."

R. at2025p.61.
While counsel may convince a jury, who is without benefit of a record, that
the evidence was different than that which was actually presented, this Court has the
ability to review what actually occurred and does not have to rely on incorrect
representations about the testimony. Obviously, if there had been any testimony of the
kind Mr. Young's counsel informed the jury had been given, it would have been
brought to this Court's attention; It was not. There was no such testimony. While
Mr. Young argues that the jury was free to adopt his view of the evidence, that
freedom does not permit the jury to substitute Mr. Young's version of the testimony for
that which was actually given.
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POINT II.

A PROMISE TO PAY A SALARIED EMPLOYEE AN
UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL "FAIR"
COMPENSATION IS UNENFORCEABLE.

Mr. Young makes no attempt to provide this Court with any legal authority
that an employee, working for a fixed salary, has an enforceable claim for additional
compensation if he is promised by his employer that he will be treated "fairly."
Instead, he cites to Corbin on Contracts for the rules applicable when employers and
employees don't agree to an express salary, but rather agree that the employee will
receive a fair or reasonable wage for his services. That is not this case. Mr. Young
expressly agreed to provide his services for a fixed salary. In the absence of an
enforceable express modification of that agreement, Mr. Young has no claim for any
additional compensation. See, Meaney v. Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n, Inc.. 735 A.2d
813 (Conn. 1999).
Mr. Young's total failure to address the legal argument that promises of
additional "fair" compensation to salaried employees are uniformly found to be
unenforceable underscores the fact that his position is simply legally untenable.
He attempts to suggest that there is Utah authority supporting his position and
cites The Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Dor Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994), a
Court of Appeals case which does not touch upon any issue before this Court.
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In Won-Dor. the plaintiff was claiming that the defendant breached its
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant claimed that at the time
of the alleged breach, it had no contractual relationship with plaintiff because any such
relationship had been terminated. The Court of Appeals simply held that the evidence
presented was susceptible to a finding that the parties had an ongoing contractual
relation and had agreed between themselves that defendant's payment for plaintiff's
services would be a reasonable fee, not the amount previously agreed to for different
services to be rendered by plaintiff. Both sides agreed that the price term of the prior
contract was not in effect on the date of the alleged breach of the covenant.
In our case, both sides agree that Mr. Young's original employment contract
remained in effect throughout his employment unless modified by a subsequent
enforceable agreement. The issue before the Court is simply whether the subsequent
agreement as alleged by Mr. Young is enforceable. Won-Dor sheds no light on that
question.
As noted in the firm's opening brief, and unrebutted by Mr. Young, the cases
actually dealing with the issue before this Court uniformly hold that alleged promises of
additional "fair" compensation to salaried employees are unenforceable in the absence
of an agreement about what constitutes fair compensation or a formula for fixing such
an amount. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ford, 555 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. App. 2001).
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POINT III.

THERE IS NO ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT REGARDING ANY
PURPORTED BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING.

Mr. Young asserts that there was ample evidence to support the jury verdict
with regard to his claim for beach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and chides the firm for ignoring this claim. The difficulty with this argument is that the
jury was not asked to, and therefore obviously did not, make any finding regarding
such a claim. Having failed to seek a jury determination of that claim, Mr. Young
cannot now assert that a favorable finding might have been made had it been sought.
The good faith and fair dealing claim is not an issue before this Court.
POINT IV.

THE FIRM DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

While Mr. Young makes the claim that the firm "utterly failed" to marshal
the evidence, it is noteworthy that in citing to the transcript of the proceedings below
dealing with any negotiations between the parties regarding his compensation, Mr.
Young quotes the exact portions of the transcript contained in the firm's brief. The
only purported addition Mr. Young brought to the Court's attention was a short passage
from the testimony of John Chindlund regarding the general basis for compensation at
the firm, which Mr. Young contends made "fair" compensation a term of his original
employment contract. Such testimony could not be supportive of the verdict because
both sides agree that Mr. Chindlund played no role in negotiating Mr. Young's original
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contract of employment. The claim relating to the failure to marshal the evidence is
baseless and merely reflects Mr. Young's discomfort in reaching the merits of his
claims.
POINT V.

ALL EMPLOYEES OWE THEIR EMPLOYER THE DUTY OF
NONCOMPETITION.

In his brief, Mr. Young contends that in Microbiological Research Corp. v.
Mima, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), this Court held that mere employees are not
fiduciaries of their employers. This contention is made despite the fact that the Court's
opinion in Muna says not one word about the fiduciary duties, or lack thereof, of socalled "mere employees." The issue which Mr. Young asserts was decided in Muna
was not raised by the parties or addressed by the Court in any way. Yet the Muna
decision is the basis for Mr. Young's oft repeated contention that the law in Utah is that
"mere employees such as Mr. Young are not fiduciaries." Brief of Young at p. 43.
Such is not the law of Utah or any other jurisdiction.

Mr. Young comes to his

imaginary holding in Muna by substituting the words "the employee" for the word
"defendant's" in a quoted passage. Brief of Young at p. 43. The firm submits that no
competent lawyer could read the Muna opinion and come away with a sincere belief
that it holds, suggests or implies that employees owe no fiduciary duty to their
employer.
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The same is true of the other Utah case cited by Mr. Young, Renshaw v.
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 49 P.2d 403 (Utah 1935). In that case, the Court held that
the relationship between an employer and an employee wasn't such as to impose upon
the employer any affirmative disclosure duties running to the employee in connection
with a transaction unrelated to the employee's duties. To cite that case for the
proposition that it holds that an employee owes his employer no fiduciary duty is the
logical equivalent of citing a case holding that a client owes his lawyer no fiduciary
duties for the proposition that the lawyer-client relationship isn't fiduciary in nature.
Under agency principles, it is axiomatic that the fiduciary duties run from the agent to
the principal.
In point of fact, Utah law recognizes that employees do owe fiduciary duties
to their employers. In Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994),
the Court of Appeals notes that an employee owes his employer a fiduciary duty.
A former employee may not use confidential information
obtained during the course of his or her employment to
compete with his or her former employer . . . . A written
contract or formal employment contract is not required in
order to create this duty. "It is settled . . . that the duty
of an employee not to disclose confidential information is
grounded on'basic principles of equity' . . . and upon an
implied contract, growing out of the nature of the
employer-employee relation."
Since an express contract creating a fiduciary duty
running from [the employee] to [the employer] was not
-9-

necessary in this case, [the employee's] arguments that
he did not have an employment contract or that his
employment application did not create a fiduciary duty
are not persuasive.
872 P.2d at 496-97 (citations omitted).
Mr. Young complains that the firm did not cite or attempt to distinguish the
"dozens" of cases which Mr. Young relied upon to persuade the trial court that, as a
mere employee, he had no fiduciary duty to the firm. The firm failed to mention these
cases, most of which are cited in footnote 18 of Mr. Young's brief, because they in no
way support his position and it assumed he would not repeat his mischaracterization of
those cases before this Court. Since he has chosen to do so, a response is in order.
In the trial court, Mr. Young cited a number of "corporate opportunity"
doctrine cases which he claimed stood for the proposition that because employees aren't
subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine they, therefore, owe their corporate
employer no fiduciary duties of any nature. This suggestion is completely false and
could only be made by someone who ignores the express language of the cases cited.
For example, Delta Environmental Prods., Inc. v. McGrew, 56 F. Supp. 2d 716 (D.
Miss. 1999), cited by Mr. Young in footnote 18, provides an express caution not to
draw the very conclusion for which Mr. Young cites the case.
In McGrew, two employees were sued by their former employer in a
counterclaim alleging that they competed against their former employer and that they
-10-

usurped corporate opportunities. The former employees moved to dismiss the claim of
usurpation, but not the competition claim, on the ground that they owed no duty to
surrender corporate opportunities because they were not officers of the employer
corporation. The court agreed and dismissed that aspect of the claim. In doing so, the
Court made it clear that it "is not suggesting that [the employees] owed no fiduciary
duties to [the employer]." 56 F. Supp. 2d at 719n.4. Despite this statement, Mr.
Young blithely asserts that such is the exact holding of the case. To suggest that a case
stands for a proposition which it expressly disavows is not only intellectually dishonest
but also reflects a lack of respect for the limits of advocacy.
Mr. Young apparently doesn't understand the distinction between the
corporate opportunity doctrine and the duty of noncompetition. This distinction was
explained quite simply by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in General Automotive
Manufacturing Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659 (Wise. 1963). In Singer, the defendant
was sued for breach of the duty of noncompetition. He attempted to defend, as does
Mr. Young, by asserting that his dealings with customers amounted to the diversion of
a corporate opportunity, which he asserted he owed no duty to avoid. The Court
rejected that assertion.
Singer contends that the doctrine of 'Corporate
Opportunity' applies in the case at bar and that the
elements of the doctrine are not satisfied under the facts
of this case.
-11-

The doctrine of corporate opportunity is a species of the
duty of [a] fiduciary to act with undivided loyalty. The
doctrine applies to the acquisition of property, tangible
or intangible, present or future, [by] a person who
occupies a fiduciary relationship to a corporation which
is in opposition to the corporation. Although the
elements of the breach of the fiduciary duty in this
doctrine are similar to those in the present case presently
we are concerned with the operation of a competing
business in competition with a corporation and the
retention of secret profits arising therefrom and not with
the narrow question of the acquisition of property in
opposition to a corporation.
We conclude that Singer's independent activities were in
competition with [his employer] and were in violation of
his obligation of fidelity to that corporation . . .
120N.W.2dat663.
Mr. Young's premise, that if an individual can't be found liable for violating
the corporate opportunity doctrine he therefore is not a fiduciary of the corporation, is
simply wrong.
In DSC Communications Corp. v. Next Level Communications, 107 F.3d
322 (5th Cir. 1997), the Court upheld a finding that employee defendants breached their
duty to their former employer by misappropriating trade secrets but reversed a
determination of liability for diversion of corporate opportunity. The Court noted that
the usurpation of corporate opportunity doctrine does not
apply to all corporate fiduciaries, but is limited to
officers, directors, and major shareholders.
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107 F.3d at 326 (quoting United Teachers Assoc. Ins. Co. v. Mackeen & Bailey, Inc.,
99 F.3d 645 (5lh Cir. 1996), which also found a breach of duty by a fiduciary who
wasn't liable under the corporate opportunity doctrine).
Not only did Mr. Young misstate the holding of Next Leveh he altered a
quotation from the case in such a fashion as to disguise the fact that it refuted his
position. In the court below, and in footnote 18 of his brief in this Court, Mr. Young
quotes Next Level as follows: "the usurpation of corporate opportunity doctrine is
inapplicable to any [one] . . . who is not also an officer, director, or major shareholder
of a corporate entity." Where he has written "any[one] . . . ," the Court wrote "any
fiduciary." 107 F.3d at 326-27. As the case holds that there are fiduciaries who are
not subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine, it repudiates Mr. Young's argument,
as does United Teachers Assoc. Ins. Co. v. Mackeen & Bailey, Inc., 99 F.3d 645 (5th
Cir. 1996). To then cite these cases for the proposition that mere employees aren't
fiduciaries because they aren't subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine is
indefensible.
It is fundamental and rudimentary that agents owe their principal fiduciary
duties. As acknowledged in the Restatement, "An agent is a fiduciary with respect to
matters within the scope of his agency." Restatement 2d, Agency § 13. The fiduciary
duties owed by all agents to their principal include
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the duty to account for profits arising out of employment,
the duty not to acts as, or on account of, an adverse party
without principal's consent, the duty not to compete with
the principal on his own account or for another in matters
relating to the subject of the agency, and the duty to deal
fairly with the principal in all transactions between them.
Id. at comment a (emphasis added).
Mr. Young's rejoinder to this proposition is an odd piece of sophistry. He says
that if agents are fiduciaries then, under what he purports to be Utah law, employees are
not agents because Utah law holds that employees aren't fiduciaries. Needless to say, he
points to no holding or any language from any decision which says or implies any such
thing. It is beyond doubt that all employees are agents of their employers, though not all
agents are employees.
The employer and employee relationship may be viewed as
falling within the broader relationship of principal and
agent, and some courts equate the term "employee" with
"agent." Agency and employment relationships are similar
in that both involve employment and service under an
express or implied agreement. In some cases, however, a
distinction has been drawn between an "employee agent,"
who is hired to render service to the employer and is
subject to the employer's control or right to control, and
"non-employee agent," who is employed to represent the
principal in reference to a contractual obligation with a
third person and retains control over the manner in which
he or she renders the service.
27 Am. Jur. 2d, Employment Relationship § 3 at p. 555 (1996).
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In order for Mr. Young to claim he didn't owe the firm a duty of
noncompetition he has to argue that he wasn't an agent of the firm. Having acknowledged
that he was an employee of the firm, Mr. Young has disproved his own argument.
While the Restatement does not expressly refer to "employees" as agents, it does
so in the case of "servants." Restatement 2d, Agency § 2(2). "Servant" is simply another
word for "employee." In defining "employee," Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6lh Ed.
1991) indicates that "'Servant' is synonymous with 'employee'." Id. at 363. It also offers
as the first definition of "servant": "An employee." Id. at 953.
In short, Mr. Young's contention that he was not an agent of the firm and owed
the firm no duty of noncompetition is baseless. An employee is an agent by definition and
an agent is a fiduciary by definition.
It simply can't be denied that "an employee owes his employer a duty of loyalty
which prohibits him from soliciting the employer's customers for himself, or from
otherwise competing with his employer, while he is still employed." Caton Corp v. Giere,
971 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992).
This duty of noncompetition isn't limited to officers and directors. "Rather, all
employees owe their employers a fiduciary duty of loyalty with respect to any and all
matters within the scope of their agency." Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoll, 955 F. Supp.
849, 858 (N.D.Ill. 1996). As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "[t]his is a rule
of common sense and honesty as well as of law." Bank of California v. Hoffman, 38
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N.W.2d 506, 509 (Wise. 1949). Both by his conduct and in his arguments attempting to
excuse that conduct, Mr. Young has demonstrated his lack of familiarity with common
sense, honesty and the law.
While he can provide no authority for his contention that a mere employee is
free to compete with his employer, Mr. Young does attempt to avoid the consequences of
his dishonesty by minimizing the significance of his conversion of thousands of dollars in
light of his earning a fee of hundreds of thousands. It should take no citation of authority
to convince the Court that the duty of noncompetition is equally applicable to productive
and nonproductive employees alike. While Mr. Young believes his defalcation was
"trivia," courts have not shared this view when finding that such conduct by lawyers
warranted disbarment and suspension. See, e.g.. Rogers v. The Mississippi Bar, 731 P.2d
1158 (Miss. 1999); In re Brunner. 535 N.W.3d 438 (Wis. 1995); In re Murdock, 968 P.2d
1270 (Or. 1998).
Mr. Young's total lack of recognition that his conduct was dishonest is apparent
from his brief, wherein he argues that the fact he wasn't actually paid for work performed
while at the firm until after he left the firm somehow vitiates the wrongfulness of his
actions. The undisputed fact is that while he was an employee of the firm hired to practice
law, Mr. Young practiced law in competition with the firm and kept the money he earned
while so doing. This conduct was a wilful and deliberate breach of the duty he owed the
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firm and fully warrants the forfeiture of any salary paid to him during the period of his
disloyalty.
POINT VI.

MR. YOUNG HAS NO ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY FEES.

It is firmly established that the
general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain exceptions, a
party is entitled to attorney fees only if authorized by
statute or contract.
Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998).
This Court's decision in Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), is
inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Heslop, this Court held that wrongfully terminated
employees could recover attorneys fees as consequential damages because
Terminated employees, like injured insurance claimants,
find themselves in a particularly vulnerable position once
the employer breaches the employment agreement.
Employers can reasonably foresee that wrongfully
terminated employees will be forced to file suit to enforce
their employment contracts and will foreseeably incur
attorney fees.
839 P.2d at 840-41 (emphasis added).
Mr. Young was not terminated, he resigned. He did not allege wrongful
termination in his complaint and no such issue was presented to the jury. He simply does
not qualify for the attorney fee exception announced in Heslop.
Mr. Young argues that because it was foreseeable that he would incur attorney
fees if the firm breached what he alleged to have been an express contract, the logic of
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Heslop should apply to his circumstances. The flaw in this argument is that it would apply
to every breach of contract action and would lead to a rule, in contravention of
longstanding authority of this Court, that attorney fees would be available in all breach of
contract claims. If foreseeability was the exclusive test for an entitlement to fees, then, as
noted by the Utah Court of Appeals, such an approach
would eviscerate the general rule; attorney fees would be
awarded virtually every time a party is found in breach of
contract.
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1992).
While it can be argued that Heslop was wrongly decided and should be
abandoned, the Court need not consider that question. It can resolve Mr. Young's claim
for fees adversely to him by simply refusing to expand the Heslop exception beyond its
present scope: wrongfully terminated employees. The failure to so limit Heslop would be
a "drastic result" (Collier, supra, 827 P.2d at 984), inconsistent with the firmly established
"American rule" governing the award of attorney fees.
Mr. Young's suggestion that Pugh v. North American Warranty Services. Inc..
2000 UT App 121, expanded the rule of foreseeability of fees as the basis for an award of
fees as consequential damages in any contract case is incorrect. In Pugh, the Court of
Appeals held that the contract in question was an insurance contract and, therefore, within
the recognized exception for first party insurance contracts. 2000 UT App at if 1 15-16.
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The Court below did not error in denying Mr. Young the opportunity to present
evidence of his fees as a consequential damage of the claimed breach of contract.
POINT VII.

MR. YOUNG HAS NO ENTITLEMENT TO PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST.

Mr. Young's contention that he has an entitlement to prejudgment interest
ignores the undisputed rule of law that before prejudgment interest can be awarded a
party's damages
must be calculable through a mathematically certain
procedure allowing the court or jury to fix the amount
following "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value . . . rather than be[ing] guided by their best judgment
in assessing the amount" or evaluating elements lacking
fixed standards by which to measure their value.
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Fell
v. Union Pac. Rv. Co.. 88 P. 1003, 1005-06 [1907]).
In this case, there was no evidence presented regarding a mathematical formula
by which damages could be ascertained. The plaintiff never suggested a mathematical
model for determining damages and simply argued that Mr. Young was entitled to what the
jury deemed "fair." Indeed, the Court's only instruction to the jury regarding how
damages should be awarded was in an amount which was "fair, equitable and reasonable."
See instruction 27.
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This Court has expressly rejected the notion, advanced by Mr. Young, that
because a jury eventually puts a fixed value on a loss in a breach of contract case this
somehow gives rise to a claim for prejudgment interest.
The analysis in determining the appropriateness of a
prejudgment interest award is whether a claim such as lost
profits is ascertainable with mathematical accuracy. It is,
of course, axiomatic that all claims can be reduced
eventually to monetary value. All claims would therefore
at some point become liquidated and theoretically subject to
prejudgment interest claims. Common sense precludes
such an interpretation however.
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
As Mr. Young never suggested that there was any formula available for
determining the amount of his claimed damages, he cannot now be heard to argue that such
amount was ascertained with "mathematical accuracy."
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing to grant the firm's motion for a directed verdict
and in failing to grant the firm's prior motion for summary judgment. Mr. Young
presented no evidence at trial that he actually received any promise from the firm for
payment of any fair compensation in addition to his salary and offered no legal authority
suggesting that such a promise would be legally enforceable had it been made. The
judgment for Mr. Young should be reversed.
The trial court also erred in granting Mr. Young summary judgment on the
firm's claim for breach of the duty of noncompetition. All authorities recognize that
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employees owe their employer such a duty and it is undisputed that Mr. Young violated
that duty. The summary judgment should be vacated and the matter remanded for trial to
determine the amount of the firm's damages owing by Mr. Young.
DATED this i/fjiay of October, 2002.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. D^vid Eckersley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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